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Abstract Knowledge requires both freedom and friction. Freedom to set up our
epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive
norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two
directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense,
and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to
investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction
and freedom, the viability of foundationalism as a solution to the problem of fric-
tion, an alternative solution in the form of a neo-Quinean model, and the possibility
of solving the problem of friction as it applies to logic and the philosophy of logic
within that model.
1 The Problem of Epistemic Friction
The problem of epistemic friction is the Kantian problem of providing our theories
with appropriate resistance so they do not ‘‘hover idly in thin air’’. Kant illustrates
the problem with his ‘‘dove’’ metaphor: ‘‘The light dove, cleaving the air in her free
flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that her flight would be still easier in
empty space…’’ (Kant 1781/1787, p. A5/B8-9). Kant’s prototype of a frictionless
discipline is traditional metaphysics which purports to provide knowledge of
‘‘things in themselves’’ through our conceptual faculty (‘‘understanding’’) alone,
having no adequate tests for its ideas or means for correcting its theories.
Kant is well aware, however, that the threat of frictionless theorizing is present in
science and mathematics as well. Friction in these branches of knowledge is attainable
by satisfying a series of requirements, starting with general logical requirements and
ending with more specific requirements. The latter are rooted in two fundamental
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conditions on human cognition: (1) human cognition requires sensible intuition, (2)
human cognition requires conceptual synthesis. The idea is that human cognition is
both receptive and creative; its receptivity is intuitive and sensual, its creativity
synthetic and conceptual. Since human intuition is sensual and human synthesis
conceptual, human knowledge is restricted to the world as it is intuited through our
senses and synthesized by our concepts—the so-called world of appearance. In
contrast, neither the world as it is in itself nor the world of pure sense data is cognitively
accessible to us. We can think of ‘‘things in themselves’’, but we cannot know them.
The two elements of friction in Kant’s philosophy are thus the external world as
it affects us through our senses and the structure of our own cognitive apparatus
with its specific forms of intuition and synthesis. These constraints affect different
sciences differently: Whereas natural science is bound by testimony of our senses
directly, through experiment and observation, mathematics is bound by our senses
only indirectly, through its applicability to experience; while physics is required to
establish causal connections between physical phenomena, geometry is required to
construct its objects in intuition and prove its theorems by ‘‘demonstration’’.
Kant’s concern with frictionless theorizing, however, does not extend to all fields
of knowledge. A notable exception is logic. Logic creates friction for other sciences,
e.g., by forbidding contradictions; yet logical knowledge itself—knowledge of the
law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle, modus ponens, etc.—appears
to require no substantial friction. This is not just a matter of the analyticity of logic:
non-logical analytic statements are subject to constraints, namely, logical
constraints. But logic, according to Kant, is special. Logic is a purely negative
discipline, setting limits to human knowledge without producing new knowledge.
And this somehow shelters it from the danger of frictionless theorizing.
The term ‘‘friction’’, in its epistemic sense, appears in McDowell (1994).
Referring to the Kantian faculty of ‘‘spontaneity’’ (which he roughly equates with
conceptual activity), McDowell says: ‘‘We need to conceive… spontaneity as
subject to control from outside our thinking, on pain of representing the operations
of spontaneity as a frictionless spinning in a void’’ (ibid p. 11, my italics).
McDowell’s conception of the problem of friction centers on Kant’s condition that
cognition is grounded in the world through sensible intuition. Relating to Kant’s
dictum that ‘‘[t]houghts without content are empty’’ (Kant, ibid p. A51/B75),
McDowell elaborates: ‘‘[I]f our freedom in empirical thinking is… not constrained
from outside the conceptual sphere, that can seem to threaten the very possibility
that judgements of experience might be grounded in a way that relates them to a
reality external to thought’’ (McDowell, ibid p. 5).
McDowell’s main concern, however, is not with friction itself, but with a trap we
are likely to fall into when trying to establish friction: ‘‘the myth of the given.’’ In
seeking to ground our theories in reality, McDowell says, we are tempted to postulate
the existence of a brute ‘‘given.’’ But appealing to the given is of no use, since being
under the control of an external force does not by itself constitute justification.
McDowell’s solution (following Sellars) is: receptivity does not make an indepen-
dent contribution to the cooperation between intuitions and concepts; rather, intuition
already contains a conceptual element. This is a radicalization of Kant’s second
dictum, ‘‘intuitions without concepts are blind’’ (Kant, ibid p. A51/B75).
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My own conception of epistemic friction is similar to Kant’s and McDowell’s in
certain respects, different in others. The problem of friction, for me, is the problem
of setting adequate constraints on our system of knowledge so we avoid empty
theories on the one hand and maximize genuine knowledge on the other. The
problem is both a problem of design and a problem of explanation. The problem of
design is the problem of figuring out how to construct our theories so they are
subject to constructive friction; the problem of explanation is the problem of
identifying the main mechanisms of epistemic friction, describing their principles,
and critically evaluating their contribution to knowledge. The two problems are
interconnected: our design depends on our understanding, and our quest for
understanding is at least partly motivated by difficulties in design. So far, this is a
variant of the Kant-McDowell approach. But my approach differs from theirs in
several ways:
1.1 Dimensions of Friction
Both Kant and McDowell restrict the problem of friction to embeddedness of
knowledge in reality. While this is undoubtedly a central aspect of friction, friction
has other dimensions as well. In particular, a theory can be empty, or fail to have
adequate friction, by being ‘‘trivial’’ or ‘‘non-substantive’’, i.e., by adopting
exceedingly weak standards of theorizing, discovery, explanation, etc. Further types
of friction consist of rational, pragmatic, aesthetic, and other constraints and
desiderata (For example, a theory subject to the pragmatic requirement of simplicity
is, everything else being equal, subject to greater epistemic friction than a theory not
subject to this requirement). Still another type of friction issues from physical,
biological, psychological, and social constraints set by our nature and environment.
1.2 Logic
Neither Kant nor McDowell seem to have regarded the problem of friction as
applicable to logic. In my view the problem is applicable to all branches of
knowledge, logic included. The problem, in fact, is especially crucial for logic due
to its central role in all areas of knowledge and its close connection with truth,
which is highly relevant to embeddedness in reality.
1.3 Philosophy
Kant regards the problem of friction as unsolvable for philosophy, and today the
possibility of substantive and ‘‘factual’’ (or theoretical) philosophy is denied by
many philosophers. The prevalent methodology is deflationist, minimalist, relativist
or quietist, and it rules out both the need for and the possibility of friction in
philosophy. No one, however, to the best of my knowledge, has given a decisive
argument against the possibility of a substantive and grounded philosophy, and
prima facie there are a number of examples in the philosophical literature of theories
whose substantiveness, at least, is difficult to deny (Kant’s epistemology is just one
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example). This leads me to regard friction as a challenge to philosophy, or at least
an open question, rather than a demonstrably unsolvable problem.
1.4 Reality
Both Kant and McDowell identify embeddedness in reality with embeddedness in
empirical reality, and such a view might lead one to conclude that if logic and
philosophy are not exempt from the embeddedness requirement, they must be
reconfigured as empirical disciplines—a view quite popular today among hard-core
naturalists. My own position is that embeddedness in reality is not, in principle,
restricted to empirical reality. Since I don’t regard either logic or philosophy as
exempt from this requirement, some might say I am committed to Platonism. I
believe this is not the case. Naturalism and Platonism are not the only options open
to the philosopher (or the logician), and the question of what aspects of reality logic
and philosophy are embedded in is answerable in principle outside both ideologies.
In this paper I will focus on two requirements of epistemic friction: groundedness
(embeddedness) in reality or veridicality, and substantiveness, especially, but not
only, as they apply to logic and the philosophy of logic. I will sketch a general
model of friction which is neither naturalistic nor Platonistic, and I will explain how
a logic grounded in reality in a substantive manner is possible within that model.
Most philosophers today are pessimistic about the prospects of a substantive
philosophical grounding of logic, and their pessimism is (or seems to me to be)
rooted in two implicit assumptions: (1) a ‘‘foundationalist’’ assumption, and (2) an
‘‘insurmountable methodological obstacles’’ assumption. The foundationalist
assumption says that a foundation for logic satisfying the friction requirements
would have to be foundationalist, but a foundationalist foundation for logic is
impossible: Logic, according to foundationalism, lies at the bottom of the
foundationalist hierarchy, hence there is nothing more basic than logic and it is
impossible to provide a theoretical foundation for logic. There are simply no
conceptual and theoretical tools for constructing such a foundation. The ‘‘insur-
mountable methodological obstacles’’ assumption says that logic and philosophy
face unique methodological problems, not faced by either science or mathematics,
and these problems are unsolvable. I believe both assumptions are unwarranted.
There are alternatives to logical foundationalism, compatible with epistemic
friction; and the methodological problems facing logic and philosophy are neither
radically different from those facing science nor unsolvable.
2 Epistemic Freedom
The problem of epistemic friction is complemented by another problem, that of
epistemic freedom. Two major elements (aspects, types) of epistemic freedom are:
(a) independence from the world, and (b) cognitive choice. Freedom of choice is
positive freedom, freedom from the world is partly negative; freedom of choice is
active, freedom from the world is partly passive; freedom of choice implies freedom
from the world, but not the other way around.
154 G. Sher
123
2.1 Freedom From the World
While knowledge is affected by features of its subject-matter—the world, in a broad
sense—it is also affected by other things. Among those we may distinguish three:
(1) the natural structure of human cognition and the social and natural forces acting
upon it; (2) the rational (transcendental, etc.) structure of human cognition, and (3)
active, intentional intervention (choice, decision, design, etc.), which falls under the
second category.
2.2 Cognitive Choice/Active Design
The construction of a system of knowledge is to a large degree an intentional
project, involving a wide array of deliberate, voluntary choices and actions,
including acts of design, conjecture, derivation, calculation, invention, ratiocination,
problem solving, abstraction, generalization, definition, observation, experimenta-
tion, revision (expansion, contraction, replacement), and so on. All these are
realizations of ‘‘positive’’ freedom.
The problem of epistemic freedom is not disjoint from the problem of epistemic
friction. On the contrary, freedom introduces new forms of friction, and in certain
cases it is a prerequisite of friction. Both types of freedom mentioned above generate
constraints on knowledge: (a) We should not develop theories whose verification
(falsification) requires brain structures, perceptual apparati, life spans, or physio-
logical attributes we do not possess; nor should we attempt to achieve knowledge
beyond the rational and transcendental boundaries of human cognition (whatever
they are). (b) Freedom of epistemic choice is essential for generating goals, norms,
methodological guidelines, standards, and desiderata, all of which are important
forms of friction. Although the model I will sketch below is a model of both friction
and freedom, in this paper I will focus on the former. In particular, my philosophical
account of logic will be restricted to friction, leaving freedom for another occasion.
3 The Illusion of Foundationalism
Although the term ‘‘epistemic friction’’ is new, the problem of epistemic friction has
been a central problem for philosophy since its inception. The most influential
strategy for resolving this problem is the foundationalist strategy, which seeks to
establish human knowledge on a firm foundation of indubitable beliefs and reliable
knowledge-extending procedures. The idea is that a given belief constitutes genuine
knowledge iff1 it is either foundational or obtained from foundational beliefs by
reliable procedures.
Foundationalism purports to meet the two requirements of embeddedness in
reality and substantiveness in a simple and straightforward manner: (a) Founda-
tional beliefs are embedded in reality directly, through direct experience or
1 If and only if.
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intellectual intuition; non-foundational beliefs are embedded in reality indirectly,
through reliable knowledge-extending relations that connect them to foundational
beliefs. (b) Foundational beliefs are directly substantive—satisfying the most
stringent standards of discovery and having ample explanatory power; non-
foundational beliefs inherit their substantiveness from foundational beliefs through
the knowledge-transmitting relations.
Foundationalism has problematic consequences for logic and philosophy, and
these, I believe, point to basic structural flaws in the foundationalist methodology.
Due to limitations of space, I will restrict myself here to logic.
Because of its extreme generality, basicness, and normative force, logic is
commonly placed at the base of the foundationalist ‘‘pyramid’’. This, however,
creates problems for logic: logic can provide (or partake in providing) a foundation
for other fields of knowledge, but no field of knowledge (or combination of fields of
knowledge) can provide a foundation for logic. The result is either that logic is
altogether ungrounded, or that logic is grounded in something other than a field of
knowledge, i.e., logic has a non-theoretical foundation. The former alternative is a
reductio ad absurdum of the foundationalist approach: The main support for a given
theory or discipline, according to foundationalism, comes from below, from theories
or disciplines more basic than it; but if the most basic theories and disciplines, those
on whose soundness the integrity of the entire structure of knowledge rests, are
themselves devoid of foundation, the entire system is unfounded.
Defenders of foundationalism might argue that grounding (explanation, justifi-
cation) must stop at some point; why not at the foundation? Granting the practical
necessity of stopping the process of grounding at some point, not all points are
equal. It would be harmless for foundationalism to stop justification at some
‘‘remote’’ discipline, i.e., a discipline D such that an error in D has few ramifications
for the rest of the system, but not at a foundational discipline like logic, whose
integrity is crucial for the entire system.
It is a predicament of foundationalism that the foundational problem is
unsolvable for it: infinite regress is not permitted, grounding the foundation is
structurally impossible, and stopping the process of grounding short of the
foundation would not solve the problem.
What about a non-theoretical foundation for logic? Is such a foundation possible?
Three contenders for such a foundation are: (1) intuition, (2) obviousness, and (3)
conventionality. Let us briefly examine these possibilities:
3.1 Intuition
The idea that logic is grounded in intuition is advocated by Go¨del. Take, for example,
the logical law (rule of derivation) Modus Ponens. The proposition stating this law,
according to Go¨del, ‘‘can directly be perceived to be true’’ (Go¨del 1953–1959, p. 347),
and this perception is ‘‘executed’’ by something like a sixth sense, analogous to the five
‘‘recognized’’ senses. The two kinds of perception differ in that ‘‘while through sense
perception we know particular objects and their properties and relations, with [logical]
reason we perceive the most general (namely the ‘‘formal’’) concepts and their
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relations’’ (ibid.: 354). Rational perception reveals a ‘‘second reality… completely
separated from’’ space–time reality, if just as objective (Ibid.: 353 fn.).
The view that logical knowledge is grounded in rational intuition is, however,
either too extreme to evade the pitfalls of unrestrained Platonism or too moderate to
provide the requisite support for foundationalist epistemology. There is no need to
elaborate on the former here, but the latter requires some explanation. Several
contemporary philosophers (e.g., Alston 1976a) attempt to salvage foundationalism
by arguing that foundational knowledge need not be infallible, need not be self-
sufficient, and need not provide a foundation for our entire system of knowledge,
first- as well as higher-order. When it comes to logic, Go¨del himself, in fact, adopts
a rather moderate Platonism: he acknowledges the existence of errors in rational
intuition, regards rational intuition as but one component in logical knowledge and
admits non-intuitive ways of grounding logic, for example, theoretical and/or
practical success.
But while weaker versions of foundationalism might be successfully incorporated
in non-foundationalist epistemologies, they appear to undermine foundationalism as
such. Consider a foundationalist theory that admits the possibility of error in our
intuition of basic principles and accordingly assigns to these principles probabilities
smaller than 1. Suppose it assigns probability .9 (of transmission of truth) to some rule
of inference, while lowering the cap on bona fide items of knowledge to, say,
probability .8. Using a best case scenario—initial premises have probability .999…—
three successive applications of this rule will carry us from established items of
knowledge to items well below our threshold—clearly, an unacceptable result.
Next, let us consider the suggestion that intuition is not self-sufficient, that it is
just one constituent in the grounding of basic principles. This suggestion is very
attractive (for example, it neutralizes Sellars’ charge that foundationalist theories
fall hostage to the ‘‘myth of the Given’’), but its viability within foundationalism is
questionable. According to foundationalism our system of knowledge is a linear or
tree-like structure, where every item of knowledge is grounded in reality by a finite
chain, descending from less basic to more basic elements, until reaching the solid
rock of brute reality. If intuition is just one medium of grounding knowledge in
reality, the foundationalist must identify other media; yet no (serious) accounts of
appropriate media have been forthcoming.
Finally, recent foundationalists (e.g., Alston 1976b, 1983) have drawn a line
between first- and second-order knowledge, claiming foundationalism has the
responsibility of grounding first-order but not second-order knowledge. This move
contradicts foundationalism’s claim to provide a foundation for our entire system of
knowledge, and it is especially unsatisfactory from the perspective of epistemic
friction, according to which embeddedness in reality is a universal requirement,
hence applicable to higher-order as much as to first-order knowledge. This
requirement could, in principle, be met by a two-pronged foundationalism,
providing distinct foundations for first- and higher-order theories, but I know of





Epistemic ‘‘obviousness’’ can be interpreted either as pointing to a special faculty of
‘‘intuitive’’ knowledge or as common-sense obviousness. Since we have already
dealt with the former, let us now turn to the latter.
The idea that logic is grounded in common-sense obviousness is open to multiple
criticisms. First, judgments of obviousness are clearly fallible. Indeed, the
development of a systematic science as opposed to everyday opinion is at least
partly a reaction to the fallibility of common-sense obviousness. Second, the idea
that logic is obvious is a vague idea. The unclarity of this idea is not just
inconvenient; it threatens the claim that logic requires no theoretical grounds. To
understand the sense in which logic is obvious (and sanctioned by its obviousness),
we have to understand (a) what features of logical truths/inferences make them
obvious (what features distinguish them from non-obvious truths/inferences and
from obvious truths/inferences which are not logical), and (b) what the normative
force of this obviousness is. In short, to understand the view that logic is grounded
in the obvious we have to develop a theory of the kind of obviousness that logic is
grounded in. But this would undermine the view that logic does not require a
theoretical foundation.
Finally, grounding logic in our common-sense judgments of obviousness brings
to the fore the problem alluded to above: On the one hand foundationalism’s attitude
toward knowledge is exceptionally critical, on the other hand it is remarkably
uncritical. On the one hand foundationalism rejects any item of knowledge that
lacks a foundation, on the other hand it sets outrageously low standards of
approbation (mere ‘‘common-sense obviousness,’’ i.e., mere appearance of
obviousness) for items constituting the ‘‘foundation’’. The result, however, is not
a ‘‘stand off’’ between the two forces. Due to the non-symmetric nature of
foundationalism, low standards at the bottom mean low standards for the entire
structure, while high standards at the top do not have the same effect.
3.3 Conventionality
Another solution to the problem of grounding logic in reality is conventionality.
Logical theory, according to, e.g., Carnap, is conventional rather than factual, and as
such its lack of groundedness in reality is innocuous, i.e., cannot cause error in
knowledge. To introduce error into our system of knowledge a theory must say (or
imply) something false about the world, but logical theory says nothing about the
world—it merely introduces a set of linguistic conventions for saying things about it.
This solution, too, is open to multiple criticisms:
3.3.1 Conventionalism Trivializes Foundationalism
In Russell’s words: ‘‘The method of ‘postulating’ what we want has many
advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil’’ (Russell
1919, p. 71). Essentially the same criticism was issued by Quine (1935): If logical
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theses can be established by convention, why can’t any thesis whatsoever (physical,
mathematical, biological, or what have you) be so established?
3.3.2 Logical Conventionalism Violates Foundationalism’s Injunction Against
Infinite Regress and Circularity
In Quine’s words: ‘‘the difficulty is that if logic is to proceed mediately from
conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic from the conventions’’ (Ibid p. 104).
3.3.3 The Introduction of Even Seemingly Innocent Conventions is Not Risk Free
Take Prior’s (1960) example, according to which we conventionally introduce a
new binary logical connective, ‘‘tonk’’, and two rules of inference characterizing it,
(1) U ‘ U tonk W, and (2) U tonk W ‘ W. This may seem an innocuous convention,
but its use would wreak havoc in our system of knowledge. Belnap (1962) proposed
a solution to the problem, namely, restricting ourselves to conservative conventions
(conventions that do not affect those parts of our system of knowledge that do not
involve the new vocabulary). But this would be of no help. Belnap’s solution is
useful in, and is only intended for, a situation in which logical conventions are
introduced into a pre-existing logical system which presumably is (or has a
sufficiently rich subsystem which is) grounded in something other than convention.
In this situation the pre-existing part of the system would constrain the use of
convention to expand it. But the conventions the foundationalist is interested in
must ground our entire logical system; so there is no pre-existing (sub-)system that
could constrain them. In particular, one cannot ground an entire logical system in
conventions without using non-conservative conventions.
A natural response to the problems of foundationalism is to give up the
foundationalist approach altogether. But giving up foundationalism is not a simple
proposition. Non-foundationalism commonly takes the form of coherentism,
relativism, deflationism, or naturalism, each of which is highly problematic from
the point of view of epistemic friction. The problems with the first three are
straightforward: neither coherentism nor relativism satisfies the groundedness
requirement, and deflationism does not satisfy the substantiveness requirement. The
situation with naturalism is more involved. Naturalism acknowledges only empirical
knowledge, but this is highly problematic with respect to logic and philosophy:
First, it is questionable whether logic and philosophy can be reduced to empirical
disciplines. Second, naturalism’s treatment of the problem of friction in logic and
philosophy is another case of ‘‘theft over honest toil’’: naturalism ‘‘solves’’ the
problem of friction in philosophy simply by eliminating those parts of philosophy
that are not amenable to empirical friction, and it ignores friction in logic altogether
(Naturalism’s treatment of mathematics is also problematic, but I will not go into
this here).
In the next section I will sketch an outline of a model of knowledge designed to
satisfy the friction requirement with respect to all disciplines, including logic, while
designating a place for epistemic freedom, to be worked out elsewhere. The model
is neither foundationalist nor coherentist, and it is not relativist, deflationist or
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naturalist either. It incorporates many themes from Quine while rejecting others, and
as such it may be viewed as a ‘‘Neo-Quinean’’ model.
4 A Neo-Quinean Model of Knowledge
Quine’s ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’ (1951) is a fork in the road. One of its paths,
the naturalistic path, has been thoroughly traveled; the other path is still largely
unexplored. I believe the second fork of ‘‘Two Dogmas’’ is deeper and more
interesting from the point of view of epistemic friction, and in this section I will
briefly explore and develop it. My goal, however, is not to work out the second fork
of Quine’s model as Quine himself would have done it. My aim is to develop an
epistemic model that stands on its own and show how it balances the dual
requirements of friction and freedom.
The antithesis of Quine’s ‘‘Two Dogmas’’ model is Carnap’s positivist model.
The latter is a two-tier, thoroughly dualistic model, dividing our system of
knowledge into two separate parts, Science and Meta-science. The natural and
social sciences reside in Science; logic, mathematics, and the legitimate areas of
philosophy in Meta-Science. Science is world- or fact-oriented, empirical, subject to
standards of truth, and governed by norms of evidence. Meta-science is language-
oriented, conventional, not subject to standards of truth, and governed by purely
pragmatic norms. The model is characterized by a series of dichotomies: the
analytic versus the synthetic, the external versus the internal, the factual versus the
conventional, and so on. While some of these dichotomies are not epistemic, they
have substantial epistemic ramifications. Take, for example, the analytic-synthetic
dichotomy (AS). AS is a linguistic dichotomy, but it is not just any linguistic
dichotomy—it is a semantic dichotomy having to do with a central epistemic notion,
the notion of truth or truth condition. We can explain the epistemic import of AS as
follows: AS postulates a semantic division between statements and theories whose
truth is grounded in matters of fact and those whose truth is grounded in something
other than fact—meaning, convention, etc. This semantic bifurcation induces an
epistemic bifurcation of statements and theories into those whose acceptance,
justification, and revision is based on factual or veridical standards and those whose
acceptance, justification, and revision is based on conventional or pragmatic
standards. To justify a synthetic statement we look for the kind of evidence that is
pertinent to fact, to justify an analytic statement we look for the kind of evidence
that is pertinent to convention. As a result, a system of knowledge based on AS is
inherently dualistic: one part of it is governed by factual norms, the other part by
purely pragmatic norms.
Such an epistemic system is highly problematic with respect to both friction and
freedom: Theories in the ‘‘conventional zone’’ fail to satisfy the requirements of
groundedness in reality and substantiveness, while theories in the ‘‘factual zone’’
fail to satisfy the requirement of (active) freedom.
Quine’s revolution consists in rejecting Carnap’s bifurcation. Instead of the
positivist dichotomies, Quine introduces a series of unificatory theses: the Negative
Analytic-Synthetic thesis or NAS (my terminology), the Inseparability of Language
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and Theory, Antireductionism, Universal Revisability, Holism, Interconnectedness,
etc. These are augmented by a few additional theses: the Center-Periphery thesis
(CP), Pragmatism, Underdetermination, Realism, Scientific Empiricism, etc. The
pivotal thesis is NAS. Like AS, NAS is, on the surface, a linguistic thesis, but its
deep content is epistemic: Our system of knowledge is a unified system, comprising
logic, philosophy and mathematics alongside the social and natural sciences. Each
statement and theory in the system is both factual and pragmatic, both governed by
veridical norms and governed by pragmatic norms: the norms of (correspondence)
truth, evidence, and justification on the one hand; those of explanatory power,
fruitfulness and simplicity on the other.
The model appears to satisfy both the requirement of universal friction and that
of universal freedom: Every discipline is subject to the constraints of friction—
groundedness in reality and substantiveness—and, at the same time, enjoys the
privileges of freedom—the freedom to manipulate its theories and their statements
according to pragmatic preferences. Logic, in this model, must agree with reality,
physics has great latitude in resolving its theoretical and even experimental
problems.
NAS, in particular, plays an important role in rendering friction and freedom
universally satisfiable. This can be clearly seen by considering (what, on my
construal, are) the central epistemic principles underlying it:
4.1 The Complementary Principles of the Unpredictability of Nature and of
Maximizing the Maneuverability of Our Cognitive ‘‘Forces’’
AS gives rise to a traditional methodology of verification and falsification. Synthetic
truth is factual and as such requires factual support; analytic truth is non-factual, and
as such is not receptive to such support. Synthetic items of knowledge are world-
oriented; analytic items of knowledge are language- or mind-oriented. The former
are vulnerable to confutation by Nature, the latter are not. This approach, however,
Quine argues, is unwarranted. No theory, history teaches us, is immune to revision
based on fact, and any theory can be either saved from revision or subjected to one
based on pragmatic considerations. Logic may be revised based on experience (as
quantum logicians require), and physical experiments may be disregarded based on
the overall effectiveness of our world theory. More importantly, in my view, this
traditional methodology imperils our knowledge by making unwarranted assump-
tions on the security of certain regions of knowledge. Metaphorically, we can put it
in this form:
The analytic–synthetic dichotomy creates a false line of defense against
nature. Nature, the analytic–synthetic dichotomy induces us to believe, is in
principle incapable of threatening the analytic zone of our knowledge. But
nature might (and some say, does) find ways to encroach upon this zone. The
analytic–synthetic policy of complacency in the analytic zone, careful
measures for establishing the correctness of our theories in the synthetic
zone, is therefore unwarranted. We do not know in advance where nature will
choose to strike next, and by restricting our defenses to the synthetic front of
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knowledge, are we not creating an epistemic Maginot line? As a matter of
prudent strategy it is incumbent upon us to maximize the maneuverability of
our cognitive resources, and just this is accomplished by NAS (Sher 1999a,
pp. 504–505).
4.2 The Principle of the Normative Insignificance of the Genesis of Theories
One may try to defend the traditional methodology by first noting that some items of
knowledge are incorporated into our system of knowledge by postulation, and then
arguing that these items, due to their genesis, are necessarily immune to factual
refutation. But we have already seen how this argument fails in at least one field,
namely logic, i.e., how logical truths cannot be grounded in mere postulation
(convention). Quine (1954), however, has an additional argument against truth by
postulation. To say that a truth is warranted by postulation, Quine says, is to commit
a genetic fallacy. In the course of building our corpus of knowledge we may resort
to postulation (e.g., in order to temporarily close holes in our theories), but the act of
postulation has no justificatory value. Eventually we have to justify all our theories
both factually and pragmatically, and their genesis has nothing to do with this
justification.
4.3 The Principle of the Non-fixity of Concepts
Traditional methodology assumes that theories change but concepts are fixed.
Concepts have a fixed life of their own—fixed relationships, fixed constituents,
etc.—independent of theories; and it is their independent, unchangeable features that
give rise to analytic truth. Against this view Quine introduces his thesis of the non-
fixity of concepts, or the inseparability of concepts from theory. Quine traces the
origins of this thesis to Frege’s dictum that only in a sentence does a term have a
meaning, but I think they can also be traced to a model-theoretic approach to terms
prevalent among twentieth-century logicians. According to this approach, the
content of all (non-logical) terms is relative to models, and models themselves
represent ways we could think of the world as being. Generalizing to concepts
(analogs of terms) and theories of the world (analogs of models), we arrive at the
view that (1) it is in the context of a theory that a concept acquires its content, and (2)
change in theory (tantamount to change in models) involves change in concepts.
Putnam’s theory of ‘‘law cluster concepts’’ adds another dimension to this thesis.
Scientific concepts, Putnam argues, do not always have ‘‘a single defining character
or a single defining law’’ (Putnam 1962, p. 53); instead, they are often ‘‘constituted…
by a cluster of laws which… determine [their] identity’’ (ibid p. 52). Whether a given
concept will actually change in the course of history is not determined in advance;
but nothing can ensure a concept’s constancy. Now, while it is true that at every stage
in the development of our system of knowledge some concepts must stay fixed, this is
no ground for reclaiming analyticity. Different concepts may be held fixed at
different stages, i.e., there are no inherently fixed concepts.
It is easy to see that each of these principles incorporates both elements of
friction and elements of freedom. The first principle (or pair of principles) requires
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that each and every theory in our system of knowledge be ready to respond to
challenges from reality, and at the same time allows great latitude in how the system
as a whole responds to such challenges. The second principle acknowledges
freedom of postulation, but requires that each postulate will eventually be grounded
in reality. And the third principle allows choice in creating (changing, replacing,
developing) concepts, but subjects this choice to veridical standards through
intrinsic connection between concepts and theories.
NAS and the related principles, however, do not, by themselves, constitute an
adequate model of knowledge. NAS gives rise to a holistic model of knowledge, but
holism faces two potentially fatal difficulties: lack of structure, and disconnection to
reality.
4.4 Structureless Holism
Quinean holism purportedly has two faces: on the one hand Quine conceives of our
total system of knowledge as the smallest unit of epistemic significance; on the
other hand, he views our system of knowledge as a web of interconnected elements.
There is an exegetical question concerning the first face of Quine’s holism, gleaned
from such claims as ‘‘I am now urging… that even in taking the statement as unit we
have drawn our grid too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of
science’’ (Quine 1951, p. 42). But some critics took it literally, and it is important to
distinguish the conception of holism proposed in this paper from that conception.
The problem with that conception is that if the smallest unit of epistemic
significance is our system of knowledge as a whole, then there is at most one
significant unit of knowledge, namely, our system of knowledge in its entirety. But
this, the critics have pointed out, is an untenable position. Thus, speaking of Quine’s
holism, Dummett says:
[I]f a total theory is represented as indecomposable into significant parts, then we
cannot derive its significance from its internal structure, since it has none; and we
have nothing else from which we may derive it (Dummett 1973a, p. 600).
And Glymour adds:
No working scientist acts as though the entire sweep of scientific theory faces the
tribunal of experience as a single, undifferentiated whole (Glymour 1980, p. 3).
The point is that if the minimal unit of epistemic significance is ‘‘total theory’’ or
‘‘the entire sweep of scientific theory’’, then knowledge is an ‘‘all or nothing’’ affair:
either we construct our system of knowledge all at once, or we do not have a system
of knowledge at all; either we test it all in one fell swoop, or we do not test it at all;
either we replace it in its entirety, or we do not change it at all; either we grasp
(learn, communicate) it ‘‘in a single spasm of seamless cognition’’ (Fodor and
Lepore 1992, p. 9), or we do not grasp it at all; either we ground it all at once, or we
do not ground it at all. Furthermore, if to explain a total theory is, to a large extent,
to significantly tie together its various significant constituents (e.g., show how its
physical and mathematical constituents are related to each other), then, if it has no
epistemically significant constituents, such an explanation is impossible. We may
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liken our system of knowledge, under this conception, to a huge atom or blob: no
inner structure, no differentiation, no interrelations, nothing to work with. The very
idea of a system of knowledge becomes meaningless: ‘‘truth’’, ‘‘hypothesis’’,
‘‘observation’’, ‘‘inference’’—all notions applicable to smaller epistemic units—lose
their significance; experiment—an activity that takes a specific segment of our total
theory as epistemically significant and subjects it to a test—is ruled out; the
connection between knowledge and rationality—a connection that has to do mostly
with units smaller than our entire system, is largely undermined. And so on.
Quine’s second conception of holism is more promising: Our system of
knowledge is a network of highly interconnected elements whose interconnections
assume a multitude of forms. Such a system is, in principle, explainable, learnable,
comprehensible, and otherwise accessible, provided its interconnections are
manageably structured rather than chaotic. The viability of Quine’s holistic model
thus requires the imposition of a manageable structure on the interconnected web of
elements of knowledge.
4.5 Disconnection from Reality
By itself, a holistic network of interconnected elements (structured or unstructured)
need not be connected to reality. Any consistent collection of interconnected
elements would pay the bill, be it factual or fictional. To turn his system of
knowledge into a system of knowledge of reality Quine has to supply it with a
factual anchor or grounding, and this holism by itself cannot do.
The solution to both problems comes in the form of a new thesis, the Center-
Periphery thesis, or CP. CP structures our system of knowledge as, figuratively, a
circle with two distinguished zones: center and periphery. Intensionally, the center
and the periphery represent two distinct dualities. On the one hand, the periphery is
the area where our system of knowledge is directly connected to reality, the
center—the area least connected to reality; on the other hand, the center is the center
of interconnections (the locus of generality), the periphery—the region of least
interconnected units (locus of particularity). Extensionally, logic, mathematics and
philosophy occupy the center; experimental science the periphery. Other areas of
knowledge—in particular theoretical science—occupy the intermediate zones.
In making its crucial contributions to the Quinean model, however, CP threatens
to undermine NAS. There is no longer one, homogeneous domain of knowledge,
governed by both veridical and pragmatic norms but, as in traditional empiricist
models, a center governed by pragmatic norms and a periphery governed by
veridical, experiential norms (the intermediate zone being governed by a
combination of the two). It is true that statements in the center are connected to
the periphery and conflicts in the periphery can be resolved in the center. But
conflicts with reality occur only in the periphery, and changes in the center are
purely pragmatic. A logical statement is not accepted (or rejected) because it itself
agrees (or disagrees) with reality; it is accepted (or rejected) because its acceptance
(rejection) helps other statements, namely statements in the periphery, to agree or
overcome conflicts with reality. Logic, in this model, never lies in the periphery, nor
does experiential science ever lie in the center. In this way the analytic-synthetic
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bifurcation, or its epistemic analog, re-enters through the back door, so to speak, in
the guise of a center-periphery duality.
4.6 Solution to the Conflict: From a Static and Absolutist CP to a Dynamic
and Contextual CP
Some commentators, e.g., Dummett (1973a, b), react to the fundamental tension
between CP and NAS by eliminating the latter. And eliminating the former is, of
course, also an option. Our analysis suggests, however, that NAS offers a better
strategy than the traditional methodology for achieving a good measure of friction
and freedom, while something like CP is needed to complement it. My solution to
the conflict between CP and NAS consists, therefore, in a reconfiguration of CP.
Center and periphery are reconfigured as job descriptions rather than permanent
locations of statements and theories, and in principle both logic and physics have a
job in the periphery and a job in the center. Physics’ ‘‘peripheral’’ job is to square
our system of knowledge with the physical (material, empirical) features of reality,
logic’s ‘‘peripheral’’ job is to square our system with the formal features of reality.
During periods of changes in physics logic provides the glue that holds our system
together (i.e., logic is located in the center), during periods of changes in logic,
(experimental) physics provides the constant element in our system (by moving to
the center). When veridical norms apply to logic, logic is in the periphery; when
pragmatic norms apply to physics, physics is in the center. I will elaborate on the
way logic is located in the periphery (logic is grounded in reality) in the next
section, but structurally we can see that the model is dynamic and contextual.
Metaphorically, disciplines move freely from the center to the periphery and the
other way around, and this movement is determined by task and context. During
periods of what Kuhn (1970) calls ‘‘normal’’ science experimental physics lies in
the periphery, logic and mathematics in the center, and theoretical physics in the
intermediary zone. But in the course of a ‘‘scientific revolution’’ their positions may
change. In the course of Einstein’s revolution geometry moved to the periphery; in
the course of the quantum revolution some have considered the possibility of logic
moving to the periphery. When our focus is on discovery in physics, logic is held
‘‘fixed’’ in the background (center); when our focus is on (factual) discovery in logic
or meta-logic, physics is held fixed in the background (as something that logical
discovery should not, or should not lightly, interfere with), while logic, or meta-
logic, confronts the facts in the periphery (For an example of logic, or meta-logic,
confronting the ‘‘facts’’, think of Go¨del’s discovery of the incompleteness of 1st-
order arithmetic). In this way, the model provides a link between our entire system
of knowledge and reality, and the link it provides is holistic (in the structural sense).
5 Logic’s Embeddedness in the World
One of the distinctive characteristics of the neo-Quinean model is its treatment of
logic. By placing logic (in certain respects and during certain periods in the
development of our system of knowledge) in the periphery, the new model subjects
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it to the first requirement of friction, namely, groundedness in reality. But need
logic, from its own point of view, be grounded in reality? Can it be so grounded?
And how is it to be grounded? In the present section I will offer a general answer to
these questions, and in the next (and last) section I will respond to some objections
and offer a few clarifications.
The two main reasons for grounding logic in the world, in my view, are:
1. Logical theory (like physical theory) has to ‘‘work’’ in the world.
2. Logical theory (like any other theory) is ‘‘immanent’’ or ‘‘world-oriented’’.
5.1 Logical Theory has to ‘‘Work’’ in the World
It is a straightforward observation that in the same way that using a defective
physical principle can cause a system (dependent on it) to malfunction, so using a
defective logical principle can result in a system malfunctioning. This is not to say
that we have no latitude in selecting our logical (or, for that matter, our physical)
laws. But there is a very real sense in which logical theory, like physical theory,
either works or doesn’t work in the world.
Take, for example, the system of drag and lift in an airplane. It is clear that
adopting a flawed lift principle, e.g., ‘‘to achieve a lift effect, set the flaps at a large
downward angle’’, could cause an airplane to crash. But adopting a flawed identity
principle, e.g., ‘‘If a is not identical to b and a has property P, then b does not have
property P’’, can also cause an airplane to crash (for example by skewing the
calculations used to determine whether a certain action leads to a lift effect). In both
cases we affirm a non-existent correlation between properties of objects, and both
errors can lead to disaster. To prevent an error in our physical laws we ground them
in reality, and to prevent an error in our logical laws we need to ground them, too, in
reality. The grounding of a law of identity may require different methods from the
grounding of a law of lift, but if, in reality, non-identity is not correlated with
disjointedness of properties, then (in the absence of appropriate correcting
measures) our logical theory should not contain a law that says it does.
5.2 Logical Theory is ‘‘Immanent’’ or ‘‘World-Oriented’’
A more theoretical argument for logic’s embeddedness in reality is based on the
observation, due to Quine, that ‘‘[l]ogical theory… is… world-oriented rather than
language-oriented; and the truth predicate makes it so’’ (Quine 1970, p. 97). The
idea is that truth depends on the way the world is, and since logic purports to
produce true logical laws, logic is world-oriented. One way to explain this idea is
based on what I have elsewhere (Sher 2004) called the ‘‘Immanent’’ conception of
truth (I do not suggest that this is the conception Quine actually had in mind, but this
is a conception that explains and justifies his claim). Truth, according to this
conception, lies at the juncture of three basic modes of human thought:
1. the immanent mode (lower-case ‘i’),
2. the transcendent mode, and
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3. the normative or critical mode.
The immanent mode is the mode of attributing properties and relations to objects
or saying that things are one way or another; the transcendent mode is the mode of
transcending a given thought in order to reflect upon it; and the normative or critical
mode is the mode of critically evaluating whether a given thought satisfies a given
standard or desideratum. Truth is a standard for a positive answer to the critical
transcendent question ‘‘Is it so as thought t says it is?’’, applicable to any immanent
thought t. If t is the immanent thought that object o has the physical property P, then
t is true if (in the world) o has the physical property P; if t is the immanent thought
that the collection C of objects satisfying a certain condition p has the logical
property of being non-empty (i.e., the existential-quantifier property, A), then t is
true if (in the world) C is not empty, and so on. The precise conditions for having a
physical property P and having a logical property L (e.g., A) may vary, but in both
cases the truth of the relevant thought depends on the way the world is.
Thus, take the logical theorem-schema
ðContÞ9x(Px & Px),
where ‘P’ is a schematic one-place predicate. (Cont) says that there is no property P
and object o such that o has both the property P and its complement, not-P. This is a
law concerning the formal behavior of objects and properties in the world, a law
that, as we shall see below, satisfies an especially strong invariance condition which
distinguishes it from other, non-logical, laws.
Indeed, not only is logical truth grounded in reality, logical consequence, too, is
so grounded. To see how logical consequence is grounded in reality, I will proceed
in three steps:
5.3 Consequence Relations in General
Consequence relations in general are relations of transmission of truth from
sentences to sentences: Let S2 be a consequence of S1, and let S1 be true. Then truth
is transmitted from S1 to S2. Now, for S1 to be true the world has to be as S1 says it
is—let us say that situation S1 has to hold. Also, if the truth of S1 is to be transmitted
to S2, the world has to be as S2 says—say, situation S2 has to hold. Now, suppose the
world is such that S1 holds but S2 doesn’t. Then, S2 is not a (valid) consequence of
S1. In order for a consequence relation to work properly (i.e., transmit truth from
sentences to sentences) the world has to cooperate. We may say that the
transmission of truth from sentence S1 to sentence S2 is grounded in a certain
connection between the situation S1 and the situation S2. Graphically:
Language: T(S1) --------------->  T(S2 )
World: S1 =========>     S2
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The truth of S1 is transmitted to S2 if, when, and because S1 is appropriately
connected to S2: S1’s holding in the world is sufficient for S2 to hold as well.
5.4 Strong Consequence Relations
Now, suppose the consequence relation in question is ‘‘strong’’, i.e., it satisfies some
necessity standard (physical necessity, metaphysical necessity, logical necessity,
etc.). Then the transmission of truth from S1 to S2 is based on an appropriate
necessary connection between S1 and S2. Graphically:
Language: T(S1) ------ Nec --------->  T(S2 )
World: S1 ===  Nec ======>   S2 .
5.5 Logical Consequence
To understand how logical consequence is grounded in the world, then, is to
understand what kind of necessary connections must hold between S1 and S2 if S2 is
to be a logical consequence of S1. I will offer an elaborate account of these
connections in Sect. 6 below, but briefly, my view is that logical consequence is
grounded in formal laws governing (and relating) structures of objects (properties,
relations), where the idea of a ‘‘formal law’’ is very similar to that of ‘‘mathematical
law’’ in structuralist accounts of mathematics (e.g., Resnik 1997; Shapiro 1997). On
this view, what distinguishes formal laws from other kinds of law is the strong
invariance conditions they satisfy. While physical laws distinguish between
isomorphic structures whose objects differ (e.g., between structures whose objects
are physical and isomorphic structures whose objects are mathematical), formal
laws do not distinguish between isomorphic structures no matter how different their
objects are from one another. Logic is characterized by its invariance under
isomorphisms of structures, and it is this property that distinguishes its operators, its
truths, and its consequences, from the operators, truths, and consequences of other
disciplines.
According to this view, logic is grounded in a specific facet of reality, namely,
the formal facet, and to satisfy the friction requirement logic has to get this facet
right. If, to return to our earlier example, logic wrongly assumes that non-identical
objects must differ in all their properties, its rules of inference for identity
statements will be skewed. This would result, practically, in an increased likelihood
of airplanes crushing, cars stalling, criminals going free, innocents being
incarcerated, etc., and theoretically, in a violation of the first friction requirement,
namely, groundedness of knowledge in reality, or more specifically, groundedness
of logic in the formal laws governing reality.
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6 Objections and Clarifications
The above discussion leaves many issues to be further elaborated. I will conclude by
offering two sets of clarifications in response to two objections:2
6.1 First Objection
The neo-Quinean model of knowledge construes logic as ‘‘grounded in reality’’ and in
principle revisable as our ‘‘web’’ of knowledge is confronted by evidence. One standard
objection is: If our system of knowledge is ‘‘a web of interconnected elements’’, what
constitutes the interconnections? If theyare logical connections, thenhow can logic itself
be subject to revisions? When it’s revised, won’t the interconnections be revised as well?
And if so, how can the web remain intelligible after revision?
The key to overcoming this objection lies in the holistic and dynamic structure of
the neo-Quinean model. The network of interconnections among different
constituents of our system of knowledge consists of connections of numerous
kinds. These include, in addition to logical connections, also non-logical principles
of reasoning (e.g., inductive principles of inference), general methodological
principles (e.g., the principle of unity), pragmatic principles (e.g., economy),
psychological principles (e.g., preference of the familiar), physical principles (e.g.,
the laws of gravity cannot, in the absence of a compelling reason, be violated by
revisions outside the theory of gravity), everyday items of knowledge (e.g., ‘‘I have
two hands’’), etc. Generally, it is the principles held ‘‘fixed’’ during a particular
revision that play the dominant role in connecting the different parts of our system
of knowledge together during that revision. The elements we hold fixed during
revision r are what ‘‘glues’’ our system together during r. The dynamic nature of the
model is reflected in the fact that while some elements must be held fixed during
every revision, not the same elements have to be held fixed during all revisions. The
fixed-unfixed division may change from revision to revision. Kuhn (1970), for
example, distinguished two types of revision in empirical science: revision in
‘‘normal’’ science and ‘‘scientific revolution’’. During revisions of the first type our
logical, mathematical, and conceptual principles are held fixed; during revisions of
the second type some of these principles become unfixed, and simple observations,
common-sense principles, scientific principles not undergoing change, as well as
logical, mathematical, and conceptual principles not involved in the change, take
their place as fixed elements. In the course of a revision in logic, non-logical
principles, as well as logical principles not undergoing revision, are held fixed
(partaking in the gluing of our system), while those principles undergoing change
are temporarily excluded. When the revision is ‘‘factual’’ (rather than, e.g.,
pragmatic), this is a manifestation of the movement from center to periphery
characteristic of the neo-Quinean model. During (factual) revision in physics logic
lies in the center, physics in the periphery; during (factual) revision in logic,
everyday physics occupies the center, logic the periphery. Furthermore: during
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for inviting these clarifications. The two objections are taken almost
verbatim from his/her comments.
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(factual) revision of special principles in logic, those logical principles occupy the
periphery; other logical principles occupy the center, and vice versa.
Furthermore, due to the multi-dimensional nature of the model, even principles
undergoing change can play some role in connecting our system together, i.e., can
lie in the center on one level (at one time and/or from one perspective), in the
periphery on another level (at another time and/or from another perspective). For
example, suppose we want to replace our currently dominant bivalent logic by a
three-value logic. One way to carry out this revision is to resort to the familiar
distinction between object-theory and meta-theory (meta-theory and meta-meta-
theory, and so on). Suppose, at the outset logic lies in the center. We may proceed as
follows. First, we make two-copies of our bivalent logic, leaving one in the center
and moving the other to the periphery. Then, using the logic in the center (as well as
other resources, e.g., various mathematical resources) as our meta-theory, we turn
the ‘‘peripheral’’ logic from a bivalent to a trivalent logic. Finally, we move the
revised logic from the periphery back to the center, where it replaces the old,
bivalent, logic. Henceforth (i.e., until the next revision in logic), we use our newly
revised, trivalent, logic to interlink our system of knowledge (In this scenario, we
use the old logic temporarily, as a Wittgensteinian ladder).
In practice, revision in logic will, in all likelihood, involve all the above means of
keeping our system connected. Take a dramatic case of revision in twentieth-
century logic, namely Russell’s revision of Frege’s logic in light of his discovery of
an inner contradiction in it. What background logic did Russell rely on in
discovering the paradox? What logic did he use in looking for ways to overcome the
paradox, in replacing Frege’s logic by his own type-theoretic logic? It is
unreasonable to assume that the logic Russell relied on in discovering the paradox
was itself type-theoretic logic, the logic he constructed subsequent to this discovery.
Nor is it reasonable to assume that he made do with some pre-Fregean (e.g.,
Aristotelian) background logic. In all likelihood Russell used some combination of
Fregean logic, Cantorian set-theory, and various other mathematical and common-
sense principles, as his background theory, shifting back and forth between holding
Fregean logic fixed and unfixing it, suspending some of its principles but not others.
The result was the discovery of ‘‘Russell’s’’ paradox, the devising of a method to
avoid it, and the construction (based on this method) of a new logical theory, the
‘‘theory of types’’. This logic replaced Frege’s logic, at least for a while, in its role
of holding our system together and ensuring its intelligibility (a role that, in our
holistic conception, it shared with other elements of the system).3
To sum up:
1. The network of interconnections contains numerous types of connections, not
just logical connections.
2. The dominant interconnections during a given revision are those held fixed
during that revision. Since revision in logic is often partial, it allows some
logical laws to be held fixed.
3 Today, Russell’s system is no longer the prevalent logical system. This change could be explained in
similar, though less dramatic, terms, with a greater role possibly assigned to pragmatic considerations
than in Russell’s revision of Frege’s logic.
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3. Due to its special features, the neo-Quinean model allows even revised laws,
including revised logical laws, to play a limited role in interconnecting our
system of knowledge:
a. The neo-Quinean model is a holistic model, and holistic models can sustain
some circularity.
b. The neo-Quinean model is a dynamic and perspectival model. As such it
allows considerable flexibility in:
i. maneuvering the fixity and non-fixity of logical principles,
ii. moving logical elements back and forth between center and periphery.
Let us now turn to the second objection, or request for further clarifications.
6.2 Second Objection
In the neo-Quinean model it is not the ‘‘physical’’ reality that provides friction for
logic, but rather ‘‘formal’’ reality. But what is ‘‘formal’’ reality? In Sect. 5 it is
claimed that since logic concerns the true it is ‘‘world-oriented’’ rather than
‘‘language-oriented’’, and the ‘‘world’’ toward which logic is ‘‘oriented’’ is the
‘‘formal world’’, consisting of ‘‘the formal behavior of objects and properties in the
world’’. But what does that mean? And why should we accept that there are such
objects and properties in the world? Is the world these objects and properties belong
to the physical or formal world? Furthermore, when logic is said to be characterized
by its invariance under isomorphisms of structures, which isomorphisms are these?
And which structures? What counts as a structure? Going back to the main question,
we can put it in provocative terms as follows: For logic to meet the epistemic
friction test, it needs a reality to provide friction. What kind of reality can do this
job? Not physical reality. So do we simply call the needed reality ‘‘formal reality’’
and say that it is whatever will give logic the needed epistemic friction? But
wouldn’t this be another case of ‘‘theft over honest toil’’? It might help illuminate
the explication of formal reality to address the question of whether mathematical
reality is grounded in formal reality, or in yet some other kind of reality.
This objection applies to the present paper one of the standards this paper applies
to all theories and disciplines: substantiveness. As a piece of philosophy, this paper
is required to provide a substantive explanation of one of its main themes, the
formality of logic. I have given extensive (and, I hope, substantive) explanations of
this issue elsewhere (Sher 1991, 1996, 1999b, 2001, 2008, 2009), and I cannot
repeat all these explanations here. But I can and will offer an abbreviated
explanation of this issue, an explanation that complements the general outline
presented in Sect. 5.
First, I would like to make clear that reality, on the conception proposed here, is
one. There are no two (or more) separate realities, a platonic reality of formal
entities, and a physical reality of entities accessible to sense perception. There is
one, multi-faceted reality. This is integral to the present version of holism. There is
one, rich and heterogeneous reality, a reality whose different, yet interconnected,
facets are studied by different branches of our system of knowledge. Logic is
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grounded in, and is constrained by, the formal facets of this one reality, and to say
that logic is grounded in formal reality is an abbreviated way of saying that logic is
grounded in the formal features, structure, and laws of reality or the world (I use
‘‘reality’’ and ‘‘world’’ as synonyms).
Before proceeding to explain the claim that reality has formal features, let me
note that for the purpose of the present discussion reality is thought of in the familiar
terms of a domain of objects with properties and relations, where these properties
and relations themselves have properties and relations, and so on. I.e., reality
constitutes an intuitive hierarchy of objects and properties (relations, functions) of
various levels, the first few of which we sufficiently understand (on an intuitive
level) to proceed with further explanation. In this hierarchy, individual objects are
said to be of level 0, properties and relations of individual objects—level 1,
properties and relations of first-level properties and relations—level 2, and so on.
Individuals are objects that in the present context we treat as atomic. Properties and
relations we treat, for the purpose of the present discussion, as standing on their
own, leaving open the question of whether ultimately they are, or are not, objects
(Our working assumption is that within certain limits, we can adjust our account to
various conceptions of ontological categories).
Now, the present view is that objects and properties in the world, regardless of
their ontological status (physical, non-physical), have formal properties and stand in
formal relations, and logic is grounded in the laws governing those properties and
relations. What leads us to think that objects in the world have formal features? We
are led to this view by the observation that no matter what individuals and properties
we start with, we find that they have properties that are intuitively (and, as we shall
see below, also theoretically) classified as formal. Even if we start with just physical
individuals and physical properties (relations), it is hard to deny that they have
(some) formal properties and stand in (some) formal relations. To see how we arrive
at this observation, take a domain of individuals limited to physical objects, and
suppose that it has, among other things, flowers and (flower-) petals. It is hard to
deny, as Go¨del liked to point out, that it is as much a property of some flowers—a
formal property of some flowers—they have five petals as that they have, say, red
petals. Or, to use a Fregean analysis, it is hard to deny that the property ‘‘x is a petal
of a’’, for some flower a (with five petals) has the formal property ‘‘X holds of five
things’’ (or ‘‘the cardinality of X is five’’). Likewise, it is hard to deny that some
flowers stand to other flowers in the formal relation of having half as many petals.
Similarly, each flower has the formal property of ‘‘x is identical to itself’’, and each
stands in the formal relation ‘‘x is different from4 y’’ to all other individuals in the
domain. Also: each flower stands in the complement, intersection, and union of
some properties, i.e., each has properties that are obtained by the formal operations
of complement, intersection, and union from other properties. Likewise, some
relations between flowers have the formal property of being reflexive, others of
being symmetric and/or transitive. For example the relation of being larger than is
transitive. These are just a few formal properties and relations that individuals and
properties in the world, physical or non-physical, commonly possess (stand in).
4 not identical to.
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What are the distinctive characteristics of formal properties and relations? My
proposal is that formal properties are distinguished from other properties by their
strong invariance. Specifically, formal properties are invariant under all isomor-
phisms of structures. What does this mean and what is the motivation for this
characterization? I have discussed the intuitive motivation for this characterization,
its historical roots, and its relation to the structuralist conception of mathematics in
Sher (op. cit.), and I will not be able to repeat all these here. But I will briefly
explain what it means. The basic idea is that formal properties and relations do not
take into account which individuals populate a given domain. For example, they do
not distinguish physical individuals from biological individuals, biological individ-
uals from psychological individuals, psychological individuals from mathematical
individuals, and so on. If something has a formal property in a structure whose
domain consists of physical individuals, then all its images in all isomorphic
structures have this property, regardless of whether their domains consist of
physical, biological, psychological, …, or mathematical individuals.
As an example, take a second-level cardinality property C, a property like
‘‘exactly n’’, or ‘‘finitely many’’, or ‘‘half (the objects in the domain)’’. This is a
second-level property, and its arguments are first-level properties, whose extensions,
in a given domain A of individuals, are subsets B of A. Now, this property has the
distinctive feature that it does not distinguish between isomorphic structures of the
form \A,B[, where A and B are as above. What this means is, roughly, that if B
satisfies C in the structure \A,B[, then for any structure \A0,B0[ which is
isomorphic to \A,B[, B0 satisfies C in it. Similarly, if B does not satisfy C in the
structure\A,B[, then for any structure\A0,B0[ isomorphic to it, B0 does not satisfy
C in it. Going back to our examples, it is easy to verify that indeed, if the structures
\A,B[and\A0,B0[are isomorphic, then B has exactly n elements (in A) iff B0 has
exactly n elements (in A0), B has finitely many elements (in A) iff B0 has finitely
many elements (in A0), B contains exactly half the elements in A iff B0 contains
exactly half the elements in A0, and so on. Properties like exactly n, finitely many,
and half are preserved under all isomorphisms of structures (of the relevant form).
Such properties take into account only the structural features of given arguments,
but not their other features. They do not distinguish between situations that are
structurally alike. We call such properties, formal properties. Formal properties do
not have to be of the second level. Take, for example, the identity relation, =, of
level 1. Given any pair of individuals, a and b, in any domain A, if \A,a,b[ is
isomorphic to\A0,a0,b0[ then a is identical to b (in A) iff a0 is identical to b0 (in A0)
(Here the relativity to A and A0 is redundant, but in other cases it may not be). In
contrast, physical and biological properties are not preserved under isomorphisms.
If P is a property of physical objects but not of numbers, then it is not preserved
under isomorphisms that hold between physical and, say, mathematical structures
(i.e., structures whose domains consist of physical objects and structures whose
domains consist of numbers). Similarly, if P is a property of animate physical
objects but not of inanimate physical objects, it is not preserved under isomorphisms
holding between structures of animate and inanimate objects. The relation ‘‘is a
father of’’ holds of Barack Obama (b) and Malia Obama (m) in the domain {b,m},
but it does not hold of New York State (n) and California (c) in the domain {n,c}, or
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of the numbers 1 and 2 in the domain {1,2}, (or, even, of m and b, in that order, in
the domain {b,m}), in spite of the fact that the structures \{b,m}, b,m[, \{n,c},
n,c[, and\{1,2}, 1,2[ (as well as\{b,m}, m,b[) are all isomorphic to each other.
It is in this sense that the properties ‘‘exactly n’’, ‘‘finitely many’’, ‘‘half’’, and the
relation ‘‘=’’, are all formal, whereas the relation ‘‘is a father of’’ and other physical
and biological relations are not.5
Our next topic is formal laws. How do arrive at such laws?—We reason that if
objects, properties, and relations in the world have formal features, then these
features, like, e.g., their physical features, are potentially governed by laws and
regularities. What discipline studies the laws governing these features? The most
natural candidate for such a theory is pure mathematics, or some branches thereof.
Not all pure mathematics need to fall under this category—after all, mathematics is
a broad discipline, with many goals and interests. But some of its parts—e.g.,
arithmetic, set theory, and/or some other theories—do.
How do we explain the fact that these parts of mathematics have an ontology that
goes far beyond the physical ontology we have started with?—We reason as
follows: Formal laws, like all other laws, have a certain modal force, a modal force
that goes beyond their actual applications. Indeed, due to the strong invariance
characteristic of formal properties, the laws governing them have an especially
strong modal force.6 To account for the full force of these laws (as well as to satisfy
various methodological constraints and desiderata) the relevant mathematical
theories are formulated in terms of an enormous ontology. Whether we eventually
treat this ontology as part of the ultimate ‘‘furnishing’’ of our world is immaterial
(from the present perspective). What matters is that real objects (real properties)
have formal features, and the laws governing these features are real.
Why and how does logic enter into the picture?—Logic enters into the picture in
two ways: a practical way, and a theoretical way. Theoretically, logical inference is
an interesting subject matter in its own right. Being a logically-valid inference is a
property of some n-tuples of sentences and not others, a property with unique and
interesting features, hence something we wish to know and understand. It is an
abstract property, part of the most abstract facets of reality, yet something we are
capable of studying and understanding. Practically, logical inference is an effective
means for extending knowledge. Due to our cognitive limitations and relatively
short life-span, we cannot hope to establish all our knowledge directly but have to
resort to inference to obtain a considerable portion of our knowledge. Inference in
general is transmission of truth, and transmission of truth, in the case of expansion
of knowledge (where premises are in fact true), is based on relations that hold
between the situations that make the premises true and a situation that (in successful
inference) makes the conclusion true. A method of inference that is both highly
reliable, universal (topic neutral), and stable (largely insensitive to changes in
knowledge in most specific areas), is especially advantageous for knowledge, and
such a method is supplied by logic. Logic provides a method of inference based on
knowledge of basic laws governing the formal ‘‘behavior’’ of objects and properties
5 For a more general and precise account see, e.g., Sher (1991, 1996, 1999b).
6 I discuss this point in detail in Sher (1999b, 2008, 2009).
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in all areas of knowledge. Given that formal features of objects are constantly
referred to in all discourse—one cannot talk about anything without saying that
certain objects are in the complement or intersection of certain properties, that
certain properties are non-empty, or universal, or have j objects falling under them,
etc.—we can use our knowledge of these features to develop a wholesale method for
expanding our knowledge. Logic, on this conception, utilizes our knowledge of the
formal behavior of objects (given by basic mathematics) to formulate rules of
inference that sanction our movement from what we know to what (prior to this
movement) we did not know. This it does by holding ‘‘fixed’’ certain constants
referring to formal properties and functions (‘‘is’’ of identity, ‘‘all’’, ‘‘some’’, ‘‘not’’,
‘‘and’’, ‘‘or’’, and possibly others), and developing a method of inference based on
the laws governing the denotations of these constants. Due to the strong modal force
of formal laws, the logical method provides an especially strong guarantee of
transmission of truth and, based on it, expansion of knowledge (For further
elaborations see Sher 1991, 1996, 1999b, 2001, 2008, 2009).
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